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 Inetianbor and Green: How Two 
Payday Loan Disputes Illustrate the 
Integrality Rule’s Incompatibility with 
the FAA 
Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2014). 
CAMERON C. LINCOLN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The integrality rule1 is a rule grounded in the analysis of party intent and al-
lows for an arbitration agreement to be vitiated if the selected forum is unavailable 
and the forum was integral to the agreement.  The integrality rule, conceived in 
1990, has a short history, and while it is followed by several federal appellate 
circuits, it is not consistently named or referenced.2  The Eleventh Circuit applied 
the rule in Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc.,3 where the court precluded arbitration due 
to the integrality rule.4  This case raises questions of whether the integrality rule 
contradicts the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),5 whether it overrides the parties’ 
decision to arbitrate their disputes, and whether it runs counter to the Supreme 
Court’s insistence that courts should not add obstructions to arbitration beyond the 
FAA.6  When Inetianbor is contrasted with the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion in 
Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill, LLC,7 the integrality rule’s incompatibility with 
the FAA is evident.  Further, the integrality rule acts as a non-textual addition to 
the FAA which creates unnecessary delay, expense, and ambiguity in dispute 
resolution. 
                                                          
     *  Cameron C. Lincoln is a third year law student at the University of Missouri School of Law. 
 1. The integrality rule is not officially named outside of this note, but is named the integrality rule 
for the purposes of both brevity and specificity.  The integrality rule allows for arbitration to be pre-
cluded in its entirety if the forum selected in the arbitration clause is unavailable and the forum was 
integral to the agreement to arbitrate. See Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 
F.Supp. 1359 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, Cashcall, Inc. v. 
Inetianbor, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015). 
 4. Id. at 1354. 
 5. Id. at 1349; 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. The FAA governs arbitration and has provisions for correcting 
deficiencies in an arbitration agreement, which the use of the integrality rule potentially overrides. 
 6. See Am. Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 7. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013).  The Seventh Circuit 
declined to follow the integrality rule, instead utilizing the FAA’s § 5 substitution clause to replace the 
forum provision with a different forum. Id. 
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
Abraham Inetianbor borrowed $2,600 from Western Sky Financial, LLC in 
January 2011.8  CashCall, Inc. (CashCall), served as loan servicer and collector.9  
Inetianbor paid $3,252.65 to CashCall over a one-year period in monthly install-
ments.10  Inetianbor believed he had fully repaid the loan, but CashCall disagreed 
and sent a bill the following month, which Inetianbor refused to pay.11  CashCall 
reported Inetianbor’s default to credit agencies, which resulted in a significant 
decline in Inetianbor’s credit score.12 
Inetianbor sued CashCall for defamation, usury, and violations of the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)13 in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida.14  CashCall responded by moving to compel arbitration 
under the terms of the loan agreement.15  The loan agreement stated that any dis-
pute would be resolved through arbitration by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal 
Nation (Tribal Nation) via a tribal elder, an authorized tribal representative, or a 
panel using the tribe’s consumer dispute rules.16  The district court granted Cash-
Call’s motion to compel arbitration.17 
Inetianbor attempted to comply with the court’s order, but the Tribal Nation 
sent Inetianbor a letter explaining that it does not authorize arbitrations.18  Since 
the forum selected in the loan agreement was unavailable, Inetianbor brought the 
case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.19  The 
district court ruled that the forum selection clause was integral to the agreement to 
arbitrate and that the unavailability of the specified forum rendered the arbitration 
clause unenforceable.20  The district court reversed its previous holding, deeming 
that the forum was available because CashCall showed that the Tribal Nation al-
lowed arbitration in a contractual agreement, but the Tribal Nation did not involve 
itself in the actual arbitration process.21  Inetianbor again attempted to comply 
with the district court’s order and again was confounded.22  He returned to the 
district court with evidence that the Tribal Nation was completely uninvolved in 
                                                          
 8. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1348. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2012). 
 14. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1347.  See also Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (S.D. 
Fla. 2013). 
 15. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1348. 
 16. Id. “Mr. Inetianbor ‘agree[s] that any Dispute ... will be resolved by Arbitration, which shall be 
conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation by an authorized representative in accordance 
with its consumer dispute rules and the terms of this Agreement.’”  Id. 
 17. Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2013). 
 18. Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc. 2013 WL 2156836 at *3 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (“[T]he Cheyenne River 
Sioux Tribe ... does not authorize Arbitration as defined by the American Arbitration Association 
(“AAA”) here on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation located in Eagle Butte, SD 57625.”). 
 19. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1348. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1348-1349. “The [Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal] Court does not provide arbitration. Arbi-
tration, as in a contractual agreement, is permissible. However, the Court does not involve itself in the 
hiring of the arbitrator or setting dates or time for the parties. After there is an arbitration award, the 
parties may seek to confirm the award in Tribal Court.” Inetianbor, 2013 WL 2156836 at 7. 
 22. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1349. 
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the arbitration process.23  The district court reverted to its original holding that the 
forum was unavailable and therefore refused to compel arbitration.24 
CashCall appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, challenging the 
rule established in Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp.25 that arbitration can-
not be compelled when the forum selection clause is integral to the agreement and 
when the forum is unavailable.26  Additionally, CashCall argued that the forum 
selection clause was not integral in this case and that the district court erred in 
finding that the forum was unavailable.27  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court’s decision to preclude arbitration because the forum selection clause 
was integral to the agreement and the required forum, the Tribal Nation, was not 
an available forum.28 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The FAA and the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements 
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) states that any written agreement to arbi-
trate is “valid, enforceable, and irrevocable,” unless grounds for revocation of 
contract under law or equity apply.29  As with all valid contracts, courts are tasked 
with enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms.30  When a party 
refuses to proceed with arbitration, the FAA provides that district courts must 
order the parties to proceed to arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement.”31  If the agreement does not contain a method for selecting an arbitra-
tor, if a party fails to use that method, or if lapses occur in obtaining an arbitrator, 
the FAA allows the courts to designate an arbitrator whose participation is gov-
erned by the terms of the agreement as if the arbitrator had been designated by the 
agreement.32  The FAA, however, does not contain a provision detailing how to 
proceed when the arbitration agreement designates a specific arbitration forum in 
the terms of the arbitration agreement and that forum is unavailable.33  In certain 
                                                          
 23. Id. Mr. Chasing Hawk (the chosen arbitrator) stated at a preliminary arbitration hearing: 
“…because ‘this is a private business deal, [t]he Tribe has nothing to do with any of this business.’” Id. 
at 1354. See also Inetianbor, 2013 WL 2156836 at *2 (indicating that Robert Chasing Hawk was 
selected by the Tribe to arbitrate the dispute). 
 24. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1349. 
 25. Id.  Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Only if the 
choice of forum is an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate, rather than an ‘ancillary logistical 
concern’ will the failure of the chosen forum preclude arbitration.”) (quoting Zechman v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F.Supp. 1359, 1364 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (internal citations omit-
ted)). 
 26. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1349. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1354. 
 29. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 30. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011). See also Am. Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013). The Court expressed in both cases the re-
quirement that courts enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, rendering their interpre-
tation essentially the same as any other contractual agreement. 
 31. 9 U.S.C. §4 (2012). 
 32. 9 U.S.C. §5 (2012). 
 33. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1349 (“The question this case presents is what to do when the principle 
that arbitration is a matter of contract comes into conflict with §5’s substitution provision.”). Section 5 
3
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instances, federal circuit courts have deemed the entire arbitration agreement un-
enforceable. 
B. When Arbitration is Precluded 
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of arbitration preclusion in Brown v. 
ITT Consumer Financial Corp.34  In Brown, plaintiff Stanley Brown filed a com-
plaint against ITT for racial discrimination with the Employment Equal Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) in early 1993.35  Brown was terminated in August 
1993 and was offered a severance package if he signed a release of his claims 
against ITT.36  Instead of signing the release, Brown brought suit, and ITT moved 
to compel arbitration under the terms of Brown’s employment agreement.  The 
employment agreement required disputes between employees and ITT to be re-
solved through arbitration under the rules supplied by the National Arbitration 
Forum (NAF).37  Brown argued that the employment agreement had been super-
seded by the benefits summary he had received at his termination and also by 
several bulletins released by ITT during his employment.38  Additionally, Brown 
argued that arbitration should be precluded because NAF no longer existed.39  The 
district court ordered the case to proceed to arbitration where Brown’s claims 
were denied.40  Brown then moved to vacate the award, and the district court de-
nied his motion.41 
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Brown argued that the arbitration agree-
ment should be void because the specified arbitrator and the specified arbitration 
procedure no longer existed.42  The court found Brown’s argument unpersuasive 
because the FAA’s substitution clause allowed courts to name substitute arbitra-
tors.43  The court, following the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois’s decision in Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,44 
concluded that the unavailability of the specified forum will only preclude arbitra-
                                                          
of the FAA does allow substitution for deficiencies in an arbitration agreement, but does not specifical-
ly state what a court should do if the forum is stated in the agreement but is unavailable. 
 34. Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp.  211 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2000).   The Eleventh Circuit 
provides the most thorough cases on the subject, but other circuits followed roughly the same analysis.  
See, e.g., Khan v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 2012), Ranzy v. Tijerina, 393 Fed.Appx. 174 (5th 
Cir. 2010), and Reddam v. KPMG, 457 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2006). The Second Circuit utilized the 
same reasoning, though never using the word “integral.”  In re Salomon, Inc. Shareholders’ Derivative 
Litigation 91 Civ. 5500 (RRP), 68 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 35. Brown, 211 F.3d at 1220. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. “ITT and the employee ‘agree that any dispute between them or claim by either against the 
other or any agent or affiliate of the other shall be resolved by binding arbitration under the Code of 
Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum . . . .’” Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1220-21. 
 40. Brown, 211 F.3d at 1221. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1222. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012). 
 44. Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F.Supp. 1359, 1364 (N.D. Ill. 
1990).  (“If, on the other hand, it is clear that the failed term is not an ancillary logistical concern but 
rather is as important a consideration as the agreement to arbitrate itself, a court will not sever the 
failed term from the rest of the agreement and the entire arbitration provision will fail.”). 
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tion when the forum is an integral part of the arbitration agreement.45  The Elev-
enth Circuit determined that there was no evidence to suggest that the NAF was an 
integral part of the agreement to arbitrate between Brown and ITT.46 
C. When the Forum is Integral to the Arbitration Agreement 
The question of whether a specified forum or procedure is an integral part of 
the arbitration agreement rather than “an ancillary logistical concern”47 may be 
answered by reading the language of the arbitration agreement to determine 
whether the parties intended the arbitration to be performed exclusively by the 
forum or process specified.48  In the Eleventh Circuit, the language of the contract 
is considered the best evidence of the intent of the parties to an agreement and is 
interpreted based on its plain meaning.49  Further, the intent of the parties super-
sedes the federal policy favoring arbitration.50 
Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. addressed whether a 
specified forum is integral to an arbitration agreement.51  In Zechman, the plaintiff 
was terminated from his employment at Merrill Lynch.52  Zechman filed suit, 
alleging his termination was retaliation for his objection to certain practices he 
believed violated federal commodities exchange regulations.53  Merrill Lynch 
moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the Chicago Board of Trade’s (CBOT) 
Rule 600, to which both parties were subject, and to dismiss Zechman’s claims.54  
Since the motion to compel arbitration, if granted, would have made the motion to 
dismiss moot, the court addressed the arbitration motion first.55 
The CBOT’s Rule 600 stated, “[a]ny controversy between parties who are 
members and which arises out of the Exchange business of such parties shall, at 
the request of any such party, be submitted to arbitration in accordance with regu-
lations prescribed by the Board.”56  Both parties conceded that Rule 600 was a 
valid arbitration agreement, and Zechman filed a claim with the CBOT, submit-
                                                          
 45. Id. 
 46. Brown, 211 F.3d at 1212. The court seemed reluctant to state that the court may always substi-
tute a different arbitrator or rule, and instead opted to refrain from overriding the intent of the parties to 
the contract. 
 47. Id. 
 48. In re Salomon, Inc. Shareholder’s Derivative Litigation 91 Civ. 5500 (RRP), 68 F.3d 554, 560-
561 (2d Cir. 2012).  This Second Circuit case is cited by the Eleventh Circuit in support of its holding 
in the instant decision.  Additionally, the Second Circuit discusses several Eleventh Circuit cases in 
reaching its conclusion in In re Salomon.  See e.g. Luckie v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 999 
F.2d 509 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 49. Rose v. M/V “Gulf Stream Falcon”, 186 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 1999) (“It is well settled that 
the actual language used in the contract is the best evidence of the intent of the parties and, thus, the 
plain meaning of that language controls.”). 
 50. Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1214 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Even though there is 
a presumption in favor of arbitration, the courts are not to twist the language of the contract to achieve 
a result which is favored by federal policy but contrary to the intent of the parties.”). 
 51. Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith.  742 F.Supp. 1359, 1364 (N.D. Ill. 1990).  
While not an Eleventh Circuit case, Zechman is cited in both Brown and Inetianbor as well as the 
Second Circuit. See In re Salomon, Inc. Shareholder’s Derivative Litigation 91 Civ. 5500, 68 F.3d 554 
(2d Cir. 2012) 
52.  Zechman, 742 F.Supp. at 1361. 
53.  Id.at 1362. 
54.  Id. 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. at 1362-63. 
5
Lincoln: Inetianbor and Green: How Two Payday Loan Disputes Illustrate the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
442 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2015 
ting the dispute to arbitration by the CBOT.57  Merrill Lynch urged the CBOT not 
to hear Zechman’s claims due to CBOT’s direct financial interest in the dispute’s 
resolution.58  CBOT declined to arbitrate the dispute, and Merrill Lynch moved to 
compel arbitration of all of Zechman’s arbitrable claims under Rule 600 before a 
neutral arbitrator rather than the CBOT.59  Zechman argued that both parties were 
governed by the terms of Rule 600, and therefore the court could not substitute 
another arbitrator.60 
The court looked to the intent of the parties and interpreted the language of 
the agreement to discern whether the CBOT was integral to the agreement to arbi-
trate.61  The court concluded that, “to the extent the court can infer that the essen-
tial term of the provision is the agreement to arbitrate,” the agreement would be 
enforced despite any deficient terms.62  The agreement did not specifically state 
that the CBOT must be the arbitrator, only that the dispute be arbitrated according 
to the regulations “prescribed by” the CBOT.63  Therefore, naming a neutral arbi-
trator would not necessarily violate the agreement’s requirement that arbitration 
be conducted according to the CBOT’s regulations.64  The court concluded that 
the agreement was foremost an agreement to arbitrate, rather than an agreement to 
have the arbitration before a particular arbitrator.65  Therefore, the court granted 
Merrill Lynch’s motion to compel arbitration.66 
Three additional cases, Reddam v. KPMG, LLP,67 Khan v. Dell,68 and Blinco 
v. Green Tree Servicing LLC,69 help to clarify the manner in which courts deter-
mine whether a forum can be substituted.  In all three cases, the forums were 
found to be non-integral, and arbitrators were substituted by the courts.70  In Red-
dam and Khan, only the procedural rules for forum selection were stipulated in the 
arbitration agreements, but no forums were actually selected.71  In Blinco, the 
arbitration agreement lacked any specific rules, procedures, or specified forum, 
and the Eleventh Circuit supplied those specifics under the FAA’s § 5 substitution 
provisions.72 
                                                          
 57. Id. at 1363. 
 58. Zechman, 742 F.Supp. at 1363.What this financial interest entailed is not explained in the pub-
lished opinion. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1364. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1365. 
 64. Zechman, 742 F.Supp. at 1365. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1374. 
 67. Reddam v. KPMB, LLP, 457 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) abrogated by Atlantic Nat’l Trust LLC 
v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 621 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2010).  Reddam was abrogated with regard to the post-
removal-event doctrine for reviewing remands due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the 
remand is due to events that occurred post removal to a federal court. 
 68. Khan v. Dell, 669 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2012) 
 69. Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 400 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 70. Reddam, 457 F.3d at 1061; Khan, 669 F.3d at 357; Blinco, 400 F.3d at 1313. 
 71. Reddam, 457 F.3d at 1059; Khan, 669 F.3d at 355. 
 72. Blinco, 400 F.3d at 1312-13. 
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D. History and Criticism of the Integrality Rule 
The integrality rule’s first appearance was in Zechman,73 and was derived 
from the holding of National Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc.74  Iranian Oil 
involved a contract dispute between two oil companies, National Iranian Oil Co. 
(NIOC) and Ashland Oil, Inc. (Ashland).75  NIOC and Ashland had an arbitration 
provision that required arbitration to be conducted in Iran under Iranian law.76  
Due to the 1976 coup in Tehran and the danger to Americans that persisted at the 
time, Ashland refused to arbitrate in Iran, and NIOC instead attempted to compel 
arbitration in Mississippi.77  The task for the Fifth Circuit was to determine 
whether the forum selection clause was severable from the rest of the arbitration 
agreement.78  To reach a conclusion, the court relied on the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts79 which required that NIOC show that the forum selection was mere-
ly a minor consideration while the essence of the provision was the agreement to 
arbitrate their disputes.80 
The court concluded that the contract’s language showed a clear intent to ar-
bitrate under the laws of Iran with Iran as the situs of the arbitration.81  Therefore, 
the forum selection clause was not severable, and the arbitration agreement was 
unenforceable.82 
Zechman took the analysis in Iranian Oil a step further and applied the term 
“integral” to the determination of whether the choice of forum is more than a mi-
nor consideration or “ancillary logistical concern.”83  The court in Zechman actu-
ally distinguished its case from that of Iranian Oil, noting that the distinct nature 
of the circumstances surrounding the agreement between NIOC and Ashland, 
                                                          
 73. Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F.Supp. 1359, 1364 (N.D. Ill. 
1990) (“Where one term of an arbitration agreement has failed, the decision between substituting a 
new term for the failed provision and refusing to enforce the agreement altogether turns on the intent 
of the parties ‘at the time the agreement was executed, as determined from the language of the contract 
and the surrounding circumstances.’”) (quoting Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 
326, 333 (5th Cir. 1987)). 
 74. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. at 333. 
 75. Id. at 328. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 328-31.  Additionally, due to Iran not being a signatory to the Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the court could not compel Ashland to arbitrate in 
Iran.  Id. at 331. See generally, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, Dec. 29, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517 (Iran is not listed as a signatory to the treaty). 
 78. Nat’l Iranian Oil, 817 F.2d at 333-34. 
 79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §184 cmt. a & § 185(1) cmt. B (1981). 
 80. Nat’l Iranian Oil, 817 F.2d at 333-34 (“NIOC must therefore show that the essence, the essential 
term, of the bargain was to arbitrate, while the situs of the arbitration was merely a minor considera-
tion.”).  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184 cmt. a & § 185(1) cmt. b (1981). 
 81. Nat’l Iranian Oil, 817 F.2d at 334. “The language of the contract thus makes self-evident the 
importance of Iranian law and Iranian institutions to NIOC. Therefore, the document plainly suggests 
that the situs selection clause was as important to NIOC as the agreement to resolve disputes privately 
through arbitration.”  Id. 
 82. Id. at 334-35. 
 83. Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F.Supp. 1359, 1365 (N.D. Ill. 
1990) (“Indeed, it is possible that the regulations in place when Merrill Lynch and/or Zechman first 
became members did not even contemplate the CBOT mechanism that Zechman now insists is so 
integral to the agreement. It hardly seems likely, then, that the notion of CBOT-coordinated arbitration 
proceedings motivated the arbitration agreement; the only ‘intent’ that emerges from the face of Rule 
600.00 is an intent to resolve disputes through arbitration.”). 
7
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including the political concerns and international law considerations, was not 
present in Zechman.84  However, Zechman did not explicitly state what would 
occur if the CBOT’s involvement had actually been essential under the terms of 
the arbitration agreement.  The Eleventh Circuit provided that answer in Brown.85  
Regardless, the court in Zechman held that the selection of a neutral arbitrator was 
allowed under the FAA’s § 5 substitution provision.86 
The integrality rule has been recognized in the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Elev-
enth Circuits.87  In Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC,88 the Seventh Circuit 
decided not to adopt the integrality rule and instead held that arbitration preclusion 
is counter to the FAA’s policy favoring arbitration and § 5’s substitution provi-
sion.89  Joyce Green, the plaintiff, borrowed money from U.S. Cash Advance 
(Cash Advance), a loan provider.90  She claimed that Cash Advance misstated the 
loan’s interest rate in violation of the Truth in Lending Act91 and filed suit in the 
Northern District of Illinois.92  The loan agreement contained an arbitration provi-
sion that required the parties to arbitrate under the procedural codes of the NAF.93  
The district court held that the NAF was the exclusive arbitral forum, that it was 
integral to the agreement, and that the NAF was unavailable as a forum.94  On 
appeal, the Seventh Circuit examined the practice of precluding arbitration where 
a forum is unavailable and found it to be invalid.95 
Principally, the Seventh Circuit looked at the history of the integrality rule 
and found that the rule originates in the dicta of Zechman, rather than any provi-
sion of the FAA.96  Additionally, the Seventh Circuit found that, contrary to the 
United States Supreme Court’s recent line of cases,97 including American Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,98 precluding arbitration on the basis of an una-
vailable forum is an invalid addition to the FAA that unnecessarily impedes the 
arbitration process.99  The Seventh Circuit proffered an alternative method.  In-
                                                          
 84. Id. at 1365-66. 
 85. Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1221 (11th Cir. 2000). If the forum is found 
to be essential to the agreement, then arbitration is precluded. 
 86. Zechman, 742 F.Supp. at 1365-67. 
 87. The Seventh Circuit declined to adopt the integrality rule.  See Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., 
LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013). The Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have all utilized the 
integrality rule.  See Khan v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2012), Ranzy v. Tijerina, 393 Fed.Appx. 
174 (5th Cir. 2010), Reddam v. KPMG, 457 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2006), Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 
768 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2014). The Second Circuit utilized the same reasoning, though never using 
the word “integral.” See In re Salomon, Inc. Shareholders’ Derivative Litigation 91 Civ. 5500 (RRP), 
68 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 88. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 89. Id. at 792. 
 90. Id. at 788. 
 91. 15 U.S.C. § 1606 (2012). 
 92. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 2013 WL 317046 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 93. Green, 724 F.3d at 788-89 (“All disputes. . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one 
arbitrator by and under the Code of Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum.”). 
 94. Id. at 789. 
 95. Id. at 790-93. 
 96. Green, 724 F.3d at 792 (“As far as we can tell, no court has ever explained what part of the text 
or background of the Federal Arbitration Act requires, or even authorizes, such an approach.”). 
 97. Id. (“In recent years the Supreme Court has insisted that the Act not be added to in a way that 
overrides contracts to resolve disputes by arbitration.”) (citing Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 
133 S. Ct. 2304 (2014)). 
 98. Am. Express, 133 S.Ct. at 2304. 
 99. Green, 724 F.3d at 792. 
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stead of asking whether a particular forum is integral to the agreement, the Sev-
enth Circuit stated that a court should assume that an unavailable forum is essen-
tially the same as having selected no forum, in which case the court should substi-
tute an arbitrator under the FAA’s § 5.100  This approach coincides with the FAA 
and the Supreme Court’s policy favoring arbitration.101 
The Green court’s conclusion relied heavily on several Supreme Court deci-
sions and on three in particular.  First, the Green court cited the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc.,102 which determined that 
the FAA’s vacatur and modification provisions were exclusive and admonished 
courts to neither add to nor depart from the FAA.103  Second, the Seventh Circuit 
relied on CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,104 where the Supreme Court enforced 
an arbitration agreement despite the forum’s unavailability,105 implying the need 
to select an arbitrator via the FAA’s § 5 upon remand.106  Third, the Green court 
relied on Concepcion’s holding that § 2 of the FAA establishes a liberal policy 
favoring arbitration and that arbitration is fundamentally a matter of contract to be 
enforced according to the agreement’s terms.107  The Concepcion case, much like 
Green, also relied on the history of the FAA, including its purpose: to elevate 
arbitration agreements to the same level as other contracts and to eliminate judi-
cial hostility to arbitration.108  Based upon these three cases, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that the integrality rule is an invalid judicial addition to the FAA as the 
FAA provides a means for a court to correct a deficient arbitration agreement by 
substituting an arbitrator.109  Further, rendering an arbitration agreement unen-
forceable when both parties agreed to arbitrate runs counter to the policy favoring 
arbitration.110  The drawbacks of following the integrality rule, as opposed to the 
FAA’s substitution provision, are apparent when contrasted with the holding in 
Inetianbor. 
                                                          
 100. Id. (“Instead of asking whether one or another feature is ‘integral,’ a court could approach this 
from a different direction and assume that a reference to an unavailable means of arbitration is equiva-
lent to leaving the issue open. What if an arbitration clause were shorn of details? What if it did not 
specify how many arbitrators, what forum, or any other administrative matters? Suppose ¶ 17 read, in 
full: ‘Any disputes arising out of this contract will be arbitrated.’ Could a court then use § 5 to supply 
particulars? If it could, then it would be hard to see any problem using § 5 the dispute between Green 
and U.S. Cash Advance. The answer is yes.”). 
 101. Id. at 792-93. 
 102. Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
 103. See generally id. at 578-84 (holding the FAA is controlling for arbitration agreements and the 
judiciary’s power to supplement or restrict it is quite limited). 
 104. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665 (2012). 
 105. Id. at 677, n.2. 
 106. Id. at 673. 
 107. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (“We have described this 
provision as reflecting both a ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,’ and the ‘fundamental princi-
ple that arbitration is a matter of contract.’ In line with these principles, courts must place arbitration 
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, and enforce them according to their terms.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 110. Id. 
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IV. INSTANT DECISION 
In Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district 
court’s interpretation of the arbitration agreement de novo but accepted the district 
court’s findings of fact.111  The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis with the issue 
of whether the forum selection clause was integral to the agreement to arbitrate.112  
The court analyzed the language of the arbitration agreement to determine the 
intent of the parties.113  The arbitration agreement stated that arbitration “shall be 
conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation.”114  Further, the court 
noted that the Tribal Nation was referenced repeatedly throughout the agreement, 
including the first provision of the contract, which expressly stated the entire 
agreement was “subject solely to the exclusive laws and jurisdiction of the Chey-
enne River Sioux Tribe, Cheyenne River Indian Reservation.”115  Since the Tribal 
Nation was included in five of the nine paragraphs of the contract, the court con-
cluded that Western Sky, the drafter of the contract, considered arbitration by the 
Tribal Nation to be an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate.116 
CashCall relied on several cases to support a contrary conclusion, which the 
court addressed individually.  First, CashCall relied on Brown v. ITT to support 
substituting an arbitrator.117  The court distinguished the instant case from Brown, 
where only the procedural rules were specified in the arbitration agreement, not 
the forum.118  The court found two other cases offered by CashCall, Reddam v. 
KPMG, LLP119 and Khan v. Dell,120 unpersuasive for the same reasons.121  Cash-
Call also relied on Reddam for the proposition that the arbitration agreement did 
not explicitly state that the Tribal Nation was the “exclusive” forum.122  The court 
found this argument unpersuasive for two reasons.123  First, the arbitration agree-
ment in Reddam did not name any forum at all, whereas the agreement in the in-
stant case contained multiple references to the Tribal Nation as arbitrator.124  Sec-
ond, while the agreement in the instant case did not use the word “exclusive,” it 
did use the word “shall,” which indicated that disputes must be arbitrated by the 
Tribal Nation.125 
CashCall also offered Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, in which the 
Eleventh Circuit ordered arbitration and substituted the arbitrator, the forum, and 
the allocation of costs.126  The court distinguished the instant case from Blinco 
                                                          
 111. Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 1348, 1351. 
 115. Id. at 1351. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1351. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Reddam v. KPMG LLP, 457 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (The arbitration agreement in Reddam 
required arbitration to be conducted under the rules of the Nat’l Assoc. of Securities Dealers). 
 120. Khan v. Dell, Inc., 2010 WL 3283529 (D.N.J. 2010) (The specified forum was only referenced 
once in the arbitration agreement in Khan). 
 121. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1351. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. See Reddam, 457 F.3d at 1060. 
 125. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1351. 
 126. Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 400 F.3d 1308, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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because the Blinco arbitration agreement only contained a general arbitration 
clause without a specified forum.127 
Finally, CashCall argued that the inclusion of a severance provision in the ar-
bitration agreement indicated an intent to arbitrate even if the agreement’s terms 
were unenforceable.128  The court turned to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 184(1), which allows for terms to be severed only if they are not integral to the 
agreement.129  Given that the Tribal Nation’s selection as the arbitral forum “per-
vades the entire arbitration agreement,” the court determined that it could not 
sever the provision from the contract without “undermining the express, repeated 
intent” of the parties.130  Therefore, the court concluded that the forum selection 
provision was integral to the arbitration agreement.131 
The court next considered whether the forum was unavailable.132  CashCall 
argued that, first, the contract should not be interpreted to require the tribe to be 
involved, and second, that even if the tribe’s involvement was required, the dis-
trict court’s ruling was clearly erroneous.133 
CashCall’s first argument required the Eleventh Circuit to review the lan-
guage of the contract.134  The court reviewed the contract’s provision that arbitra-
tion “shall be conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation by an author-
ized representative.”135  The court decided that the only reasonable interpretation 
of this provision required the involvement of the tribe.136  Additionally, the first 
provision of the agreement placed the agreement under the “sole subject matter 
and personal jurisdiction” of the Tribal Nation.137  Therefore, the court concluded 
that the Tribal Nation’s involvement was required.138 
Having determined the necessity of the Tribal Nation’s involvement, the court 
considered whether the district court’s determination that the Tribal Nation was 
unavailable was clear error.139  The appellate court began its clear error review by 
noting the letter sent from the Tribal Nation to the plaintiff which stated that the 
tribe does not authorize arbitration.140  The court also considered the statement 
made by one of the Tribal Nation elders whom CashCall had selected as arbitra-
tor: “The Tribe has nothing to do with any of this business.”141  Finally, the court 
concluded that since the agreement calls for arbitration to be conducted according 
to the Tribal Nation’s rules for consumer dispute resolution, which did not exist, 
                                                          
 127. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1352 (quoting Blinco, 400 F.3d at 1310). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 1353. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1353. 
 134. Id. (“CashCall’s first argument raises an issue of contract interpretation, which we review de 
novo.”). 
 135. Id. (Original emphasis). 
 136. Id. ([A]rbitration by the tribe and before an authorized representative implies direct involve-
ment.). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1354. A clear error standard of review requires that the district court’s 
ruling stands unless “review of the record leaves” the reviewing court “‘with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” U.S. v. White, 335 F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Coggin v Comm’r, 71 F.3d 855, 860 (11th Cir. 1996)). 
 140. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1354. 
 141. Id. 
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the Tribal Nation was not available as an arbitral forum.142  Thus, the Eleventh 
Circuit concluded that the district court’s ruling that the forum was unavailable 
was not clearly erroneous.143 
Since the forum selection clause naming the Tribal Nation as the arbitral fo-
rum was an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate, and because the Tribal Na-
tion was unavailable as an arbitral forum, the Eleventh Circuit held that a substi-
tute arbitrator could not be appointed, and therefore affirmed the district court’s 
ruling that arbitration could not be compelled.144 
V. COMMENT 
Inetianbor presents several questions regarding the validity of the integrality 
rule.  First, does the integrality rule contradict the FAA, specifically §§ 2 and 5?  
Second, does the integrality rule violate the Supreme Court’s prohibition on add-
ing obstructions to arbitration that restrict access or add expense and uncertainty?  
An analysis of the interrelation of party intent, the FAA,145 and the Supreme 
Court’s holdings on the subject,146 as well as the Seventh Circuit’s opposition to 
the integrality rule, make it apparent that the integrality rule is an invalid addition 
to the FAA that obstructs arbitration and adds expense and uncertainty to arbitra-
tion.147 
A. Integrality, the FAA, and Intent 
The integrality rule functions as an exception to the FAA’s § 5 substitution 
provision.  The rule provides courts with the opportunity to refuse to appoint a 
neutral arbitrator and force the parties to proceed in court, effectively adding an 
additional phrase to § 5 that could read, “unless the arbitral forum was an essential 
part of the agreement to arbitrate.”148  The Eleventh Circuit in Inetianbor had to 
determine the parties’ intent in applying the integrality rule.149  Some evidence 
exists that the Tribal Nation’s involvement in the arbitration was of great im-
portance to CashCall, the party that drafted the boilerplate contract that Western 
Sky provided to Inetianbor.150  However, the Tribal Nation’s involvement was 
likely not essential for Inetianbor.  The facts suggest Inetianbor had no connection 
                                                          
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. (Judge Restani entered a concurring opinion stating that the arbitration agreement should be 
held invalid on grounds of unconscionability). 
 145. 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-16 (2012). 
 146. See Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 2013 WL 317046 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Green v. U.S. 
Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013); Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Peirce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 742 F.Supp. 1359 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 147. See supra part III. sec. D. 
 148. The modified 9 U.S.C. § 5 would read: “. . . .the court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator 
or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall act under the said agreement with the same 
force and effect as if he or they had been specifically named therein unless the arbitral forum was an 
essential part of the agreement to arbitrate; and. . . .” (emphasis added). 
 149. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 150. Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (“Plaintiff asserts that 
Western Sky affiliates itself with the tribe and uses tribal law in an attempt to evade state and federal 
consumer protection laws.”). See also Nat’l Ass’n of Consumer Bankr. Attorneys as Amici Curiae 
supporting Appellee, Moses v. CashCall Inc., 781 F.3d 63 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1195). 
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to the Tribal Nation.  Rather than asking whether the Tribal Nation repeatedly 
appeared in the contract, the court instead should have asked whether the agree-
ment was written such that the parties clearly preferred litigation to arbitration 
provided by anyone other than the Tribal Nation.  Had the Eleventh Circuit or-
dered the district court to select a neutral arbitrator, the appellate court would have 
ensured compliance with the FAA, the parties would have proceeded to arbitra-
tion, and they would have been spared the time and expense of more litigation.  
CashCall petitioned for certiorari,151 adding further delay and further expense to a 
case arising out of a loan for a mere $2,525.152  Further, CashCall’s appeal calls 
into question the court’s conclusion that the parties considered the forum integral 
to the agreement. 
Additionally, the integrality rule’s relationship with § 2’s policy favoring en-
forcement of arbitration agreements is complex.  The Supreme Court has repeat-
edly emphasized a “liberal policy” favoring arbitration, but the Court has also 
stated that arbitration agreements are creatures of contract to be treated equally 
with other contracts.153  The extent to which the common law of contract applies is 
unclear.  The Supreme Court’s analysis of § 2 of the FAA concerns enforceability 
and elevating arbitration to the same status as other contracts.154  Indeed, the FAA 
was enacted for that very purpose, and to thereby eradicate judicial hostility to 
arbitration.155 
The Supreme Court has created boundaries for courts when examining arbi-
tration agreements.  In Concepcion, the Court held that an arbitration agreement 
can be declared unenforceable for the same reasons that exist for the revocation of 
all contracts, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, but not for reasons spe-
cific only to arbitration.156  Additionally, as the Hall St. decision stated, the judici-
ary is not allowed to add or take away from the exclusive province of the FAA.157  
The section of the FAA with the most judicial leeway is § 5, which grants district 
courts discretion to substitute arbitrators in the event that the arbitration agreement 
does not.158  Other sections of the FAA are far less open to judicial interpretation, 
such as §§ 10 and 11, which provide the exclusive means for modifying, vacating, 
or confirming an arbitration award.159  Yet, the Supreme Court in CompuCredit 
had no issue remanding the case to the district court for § 5 purposes when the 
NAF was unavailable.160  No integrality analysis was performed in CompuCredit, 
                                                          
 151. CashCall filed a petition for writ of certiorari, Dec. 31, 2014, which was denied. CashCall, Inc. 
v. Inetianbor, 135 S.Ct. 1735 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 152. Inetianbor, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1360. 
 153. See Green, 724 F.3d at 787-801. 
 154. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665, 668-669 (2012); AT&T Mobility, LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011). 
 155. See CompuCredit Corp., 132 S.Ct. at 668; Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1745. 
 156. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1743 (“The final phrase of § 2, however, permits arbitration agree-
ments to be declared unenforceable ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract.’ This saving clause permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by ‘generally 
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that 
apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at 
issue.) (citations omitted). 
 157. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 2013 WL 317046 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 158. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012). 
 159. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (2012). 
 160. Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattell, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578-84 (2008). 
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since the case focused on whether the statutory claims were arbitrable rather than 
the availability of the forum.161 
Taken as a whole, the FAA contains nothing in its text to suggest that a court 
can preclude arbitration on the basis of an unavailable forum.  To the contrary, the 
FAA includes a provision that allows for deficiencies in the agreement to be recti-
fied so that arbitration may proceed.162  The justification for the integrality rule is 
not found in the FAA.  Instead, the rule is an addition made through the common 
law of contract, impermissibly invading the exclusive province of the FAA.  
B. Integrality and Supreme Court Non-Addition Policy 
The Supreme Court has prohibited courts from adding to or departing from 
the FAA on at least two occasions.  In Hall Street163 and American Express v. 
Italian Colors Restaurant, the Supreme Court prohibited the addition of re-
strictions or impediments to arbitration that would increase the cost or difficulty of 
arbitration.164 
The integrality rule does place restrictions on arbitration that increase the cost 
of resolving the dispute.  In the instant case, Inetianbor had been to district court 
four times165 and the Eleventh Circuit once,166 and he must return to the district 
court again since CashCall’s petition for certiorari was denied.167  Had the district 
court used its substitution power under § 5 after the first showing that the Tribal 
Nation was unavailable, the parties could have avoided the expense of multiple 
appellate processes and might very well have achieved a resolution to their dis-
pute.168  One of the purposes of arbitration is to avoid the expense of litigation.169  
The integrality rule clearly can increase the expense involved. 
                                                          
 161. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665 (2012). 
 162. 9 U.S.C. § 5. 
 163. Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattell, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).  The Court addressed the exclusivity 
of the FAA’s modification, remittance, and vacating provision and determined them to be exclusive.  
Other sections of the FAA were examined and it can be interpreted as cautioning against expanding or 
restricting the FAA’s provisions. 
 164. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311-12 (2013). 
 165. Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 962 F.Supp.2d 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2013); Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc. 
2013 WL 1325327 (S.D. Fla. 2013); Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 2013 WL 2156836 (S.D. Fla. 2013); 
962 F.Supp. 2d 1303 (S.D. Fla. 2013).  The trial court heard the case four times due to Mr. Inetianbor’s 
attempts to comply with the court’s orders but being unable to do so due to the Tribal Nation’s inabil-
ity to provide arbitration. 
 166. Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d at 1354 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 167. CashCall, Inc. v. Inetianbor, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015). 
 168. It is possible that Inetianbor might have appealed such a substitution, but there is some evidence 
to suggestion that Inetianbor’s issue with arbitration was the Tribal Nation, who had ties with Western 
Sky and CashCall. See Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 2013 WL 2156836*, 8 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (citations 
omitted) (“Here, Plaintiff asserts that he has uncovered two new pieces of evidence that indicate that 
Mr. Chasing Hawk is biased toward CashCall. First, Plaintiff claims that Mr. Chasing Hawk’s daugh-
ter, Shannon Chasing Hawk, is employed by Western Sky. Plaintiff has attached what he claims is a 
printout of Ms. Chasing Hawk’s Facebook profile page, listing ‘Western Sky Financial’ as her em-
ployer. He further alleges that Mr. Chasing Hawk has “10+ kids and every single one of them has 
either worked for, currently works at CashCall or one of its subsidiaries ... or had illegally attempted to 
conduct an unsuccessful arbitration for the defendant.”). 
 169. Adam Milam, Comment: A House Built on Sand: Vacating Arbitration Awards For Manifest 
Disregard of the Law, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 705, 706 (1999) (“Nevertheless, many courts have stated that 
they will honor the goal of arbitration - avoidance of delay and cost of lengthy litigation - by providing 
a quick and informal resolution to disputes between parties.”).   See also Brent S. Gilfedder, A Mani-
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Further, the rule has the potential to be applied unpredictably.170  Determining 
whether a forum selection clause in an arbitration agreement is integral to the 
agreement does not have the benefit of being a bright line test.  Courts have to 
make this determination subjectively, based on indicia such as the number of 
times the forum is mentioned, the inclusion of words such as “exclusive” or “on-
ly,” and hearings at which the parties testify as to their intent.171  The integrality 
rule certainly creates additional hurdles for parties who have agreed to arbitrate 
but whose contracts were not drafted in contemplation of the possibility of an 
unavailable forum.172 
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Green Decision 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Green to eschew the integrality analysis in 
favor of meeting the Supreme Court’s insistence that courts not place impedi-
ments on arbitration avoids the unpredictable and expensive undertakings of de-
termining integrality while also fully supporting the FAA.173  The Seventh Circuit 
reviewed the history of the integrality rule and likened its acceptance among other 
courts to a rumor that is given credence without verification.174  The court prof-
fered an alternative method for reviewing the arbitration agreement’s forum selec-
tion that inherently favored enforcement of the arbitration agreement by severing 
the forum selection clause.175  In essence, the Seventh Circuit construes the FAA 
and the Supreme Court’s holdings in their broadest sense and applies them to the 
subject of arbitration clauses.  Rather than adding a non-textual exception to § 5 of 
                                                          
fest Disregard for Arbitration? An Analysis of Recent Georgia Legislation Adding “Manifest Disre-
gard of the Law” to the Georgia Arbitration Code as a Statutory Ground for Vacatur, 39 GA. L. REV. 
259, 262 (2004) (“Arbitration was designed to provide a cheaper and more efficient alternative to 
litigation.”). 
 170. Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1348-51 (11th Cir. 2014).  The cases in which the 
integrality rule have been applied have not been clear-cut in how the integrality of the arbitral forum 
selection is determined, but rather illustrate why the forum was not integral.  The Eleventh Circuit’s 
analysis in Inetianbor, however, could be construed as establishing a set of factors to consider, such as 
the frequency which the forum appears in the contract, the presence of language that implies exclusivi-
ty, and the inclusion of specified rules and procedures.  AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 
S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011); Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 171. Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1348-51 (11th Cir. 2014).  Party intent provides an 
additional issue.  The parties might not have intended a forum to be integral, but due to the way the 
contract was drafted may have their agreement to arbitrate rendered unenforceable due to poor draft-
ing.  See Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353 (2007) (Solan 
contrasts a subjective approach to determining contractual agreement with the objective approach 
utilized by the courts). 
 172. This analysis considers an instance where both parties negotiate the chosen forum.  However, in 
a consumer arbitration context, this may not be the case.  It is indeed possible that the party who pro-
vided the service to the consumer supplied the forum selection clause and the forum selection might 
actually deprive the consumer of protections available in a different forum. See William W. Park, 
Bridging the Gap in Forum Selection: Harmonizing Arbitration and Court Selection, 8 TRANSNAT’L L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 36-37 (1998) (“In a consumer or employment contract, however, the very 
same clause might deprive an unsophisticated individual of basic procedural safeguards, imposing a 
forum that is less accessible, and perhaps less sensitive to mandatory community norms such as non-
discrimination laws, than would be a court at the individual’s domicile. Thus, the value of freedom to 
choose a forum (like any liberty) must be measured against the way it operates in practice.”). 
 173. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 174. Id. at 792 (“[I]n the fashion of a rumor chain, later decisions picked up on and elaborated the 
language of these two decisions.”). 
 175. Id. See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665, 667 (2012). 
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the FAA, the court can simply sever the incompatible features of the arbitration 
clause, much like CashCall urged the Eleventh Circuit to do.176  CashCall’s con-
tract even had a severability clause.177  By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit’s use of 
the integrality rule forbade severing the provision for the same reason the court 
held arbitration was precluded: the chosen arbitral forum was too pervasive, and 
therefore too essential, to be severed.178  Had the case been heard in the Seventh 
Circuit, the Tribal Nation forum would simply have been severed from the con-
tract and a neutral arbitrator appointed, with much less expenditure of time and 
finance and no need to engage in the difficult task of determining whether the 
party intended for a forum to be integral. 
The Seventh Circuit’s abandonment of the integrality rule poses the risk of 
frustrating actual party intent, rather than presumed or common law intent.  Parties 
might actually intend for a particular forum to be the exclusive forum, even at the 
cost of litigating when that forum becomes unavailable.  The Seventh Circuit did 
not address what would happen if an arbitration agreement were written with the 
explicit language, “The parties agree to arbitrate any and all disputes with [Arbi-
trator/Forum], unless [Arbitrator/Forum] shall be unavailable.  If unavailable, the 
parties do not agree to arbitrate any dispute that shall arise under this agree-
ment.”179  The language of § 5 of the FAA suggests that such explicit terms would 
be enforced.180  Despite the risk, the absence of an integrality rule still provides 
more certainty in cases where the parties’ intent is ambiguous, since the FAA’s 
substitution provision can operate when parties have not provided explicit alterna-
tives in their contract.181  The best solution would be a hybrid approach where 
courts recognize the exclusivity of a forum where it is explicitly stated, but adopt 
the Seventh Circuit’s approach where the language is not explicit.  This hybrid 
approach would promote clarity in contract drafting while avoiding additional 
delays, costs, and the difficult task of interpreting contract language to determine 
party intent. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Inetianbor contrasted with 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Green illustrates the problems inherent in the 
integrality rule.  Had the Green decision been controlling in Inetianbor, Inetianbor 
and CashCall’s dispute would have already been resolved in arbitration rather than 
remanded to the district court.  The integrality rule operates as a non-textual addi-
tion to the FAA and places additional delay and expense on dispute resolution.  Its 
foundation in contract interpretation and severability principles is questionable.  
Further, the rule is arguably counter to multiple Supreme Court rulings and the 
FAA.  While the opposing view in Green poses the risk of frustrating actual party 
                                                          
 176. See Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1352  (11th Cir. 2014). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 1352 (“The forum selection provision here is an ‘essential part’ of the arbitration agree-
ment for the same reason it is integral to that agreement.”). 
 179. See In re Salomon, Inc. Shareholder’s Derivative Litigation. 91 Civ. 5500 (RRP), 68 F.3d 554, 
561 (2d Cir. 2012) (the parties designated the NYSE as the exclusive arbitral forum, arbitrator, and 
designated the NYSE’s rules to govern the arbitration). 
 180. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012) (“If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appoint-
ing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed.”). 
 181. Id. 
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intent, it also has the benefit of reducing both delay and expense.  Additionally, 
the Green decision coincides with the plain language of the FAA.  For these rea-
sons, the Seventh Circuit’s decision not to adopt the integrality rule is the better 
choice, especially if the Seventh Circuit recognizes exclusivity when the contract 
is explicit. 
17
Lincoln: Inetianbor and Green: How Two Payday Loan Disputes Illustrate the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
